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A B S T R A C T   
Longyearbyen has been hit by two avalanches in 2015 and 2017 causing severe damages to housing and two 
fatalities. In this study we investigate organised learning processes regarding emergency preparedness and 
response following the avalanches. Longyearbyen provides a case of particular interest as climatic change rapidly 
is altering the environmental conditions, including the risk of avalanches. 
First, the study outlines the organisation, scope and participation of learning processes, that is, who learns, 
when and what is the scope. Second we investigate whether the lessons learnt are single-loop or double-loop; if 
they focus on corrective actions of existing systems and policies, or if they address the more fundamental aspects, 
such as norms, strategies and policies. Third, we consider how contextual factors influence learning. Finally, we 
investigate how learning has been followed up by implementation. The study concludes that the first avalanche 
of 2015 led to a broad and inclusive evaluation and learning process and a series of recommended measures, 
including the establishment of an avalanche warning system. It also initiated a broader double-loop process of 
reassessing risks, redrawing the plans and maps of Longyearbyen, and raising physical preventive barriers. 
However, the second avalanche demonstrated the limitations of the established system in 2015. This spurred a 
range of corrective actions to the system, but also it established that in a time of climate change, historical 
experience no longer provides a basis for assessing risks.   
1. Introduction 
Svalbard is a high-Arctic archipelago located 700 km north of the 
Norwegian mainland, midway between continental Norway and the 
North Pole. Longyearbyen, the largest settlement and the administrative 
centre, is located in the centre of Svalbard’s main island, Spitsbergen. 
Svalbard’s mountainous landscape has experienced frequent avalanches 
in recent decades (Eckerstorfer, 2012). On Saturday morning, 19 
December 2015, following a powerful storm, a naturally triggered 
avalanche swept down the slopes of Mt. Sukkertoppen, hitting part of 
Longyearbyen and causing two fatalities and many injuries. Eleven 
houses were displaced from their foundations and totally destroyed; 
over two hundred people were evacuated. The whole community 
spontaneously organized a massive search and rescue effort in addition 
to the official emergency response (DSB, 2016). Slightly more than a 
year later, on meteorological conditions similar to those of December 
2015, another avalanche from Sukkertoppen February 2017, hit two 
blocks of flats near to those that had been destroyed in the 2015 
avalanche. No one was injured, but the Governor of Svalbard ordered 
parts of the town evacuated. These two avalanches of 2015 and 2017 are 
historically unprecedented, as no previous avalanches from Sukkertop-
pen had resulted in major infrastructure damage (Hancock et al., 2018). 
The area around Svalbard is among the most climatically sensitive in 
the world (Rogers et al., 2005). The special climate around the archi-
pelago creates unique avalanche conditions, rendering Longyearbyen 
exposed (Longyearbyen Local Government 2012). However, research on 
avalanches in Svalbard has been limited (Prokop, et al., 2018), and 
knowledge of Arctic snowpack conditions related to avalanche initiation 
in Svalbard is incomplete. The situation is further complicated by the 
changing climate and weather patterns of recent years due to global 
warming. All these circumstances make accurate avalanche forecasting 
difficult, potentially leading to increasing numbers of fatalities and 
infrastructure loss (Hancock et al., 2018; Eckerstorfer, 2012). In addi-
tion, the growing numbers of residents and tourists pose new demands to 
basic avalanche research as a basis for future forecasting (Eckerstorfer, 
2012). 
This study contributes to the literature on post-crisis organizational 
learning, addressing the need for more empirical studies (Moynihan, 
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2009; Broekema et al., 2017; Pursiainen, 2018). Crises trigger organi-
zational change, and disasters offer opportunities for learning in order to 
improve performance (Birkland, 2009). Since the avalanches of 2015 
and 2017, the Norwegian authorities have taken various measures 
aimed at protecting Longyearbyen residents. Our in-depth study exam-
ines how the characteristics of the processes of learning and their 
contextual factors affect the outcomes of post-crisis learning. First, we 
provide a timeline and overview of the organization, scope and partic-
ipation of the learning processes: who learns, when, what and how. In 
particular we explore the distinction between organizational-, inter- 
organizational and network learning. Second, we turn to the outcomes 
of the learning process, asking whether the lessons learnt are single-loop 
or double-loop – focused on corrective actions and measures to improve 
the performance of existing systems and policies, or addressing more 
fundamental aspects, such as norms, strategies and policies. Third, our 
study sheds light on how the post-crisis context as regards elements like 
political biases and time pressure affects the learning process. Finally, 
we investigate how learning has been followed up by implementation, 
examining whether and how the lessons identified are implemented and 
factors that affect effective implementation. 
2. Material and methods 
In this qualitative case study, we examine organizational learning 
from the avalanches that hit Longyearbyen in 2015 and 2017, covering 
the period from the first avalanche in December 2015, until the present. 
We focus on the role of formal authorities: the Governor of Svalbard 
(state authority), the Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Direc-
torate (NVE) (sector agency), Longyearbyen Local Government (local 
authority) and Longyearbyen Red Cross – key actors with regard to 
providing crisis response, and developing and implementing measures 
aimed at reducing the probability and impact of future avalanches and 
protecting the local community. 
Our study draws on formal documentation from learning processes – 
evaluation reports, policies, planning documents and conceptual 
studies. Evaluation reports have provided essential data on lessons 
identified and partly on measures implemented. After the avalanches, 
several reports have been issued, particularly by NVE and the Local 
Government, focusing on safety measures, risk reduction and more ac-
curate avalanche warning for Longyearbyen. We have examined these to 
establish an overview of implemented measures. 
Further, in April 2019, five anonymized, semi-structured interviews 
(Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009) were conducted with key actors in 
avalanche preparedness and emergency response in Longyearbyen, to 
investigate the learning process and implementation among key local 
actors. These interviews provided otherwise unavailable data on mea-
sures implemented with regard to lessons identified, particularly on the 
2017 case and the impact on local avalanche preparedness. They shed 
light on the process of learning as such, including the intra- and inter- 
organizational aspects. Further, they help to clarify whether any other 
lessons could be identified, in addition to those noted in available 
evaluation reports. Finally, they offer different viewpoints on what 
happened and the aftermaths of the accidents. 
An interview guide was developed by the authors, based on study of 
the literature. Questions were both fact-oriented, in terms of clarifying 
facts about the processes, and directed at respondents’ individual 
experiences and attitudes. All informants are number-coded (see 
Table 1) and referred to by number in the text. The general criterion for 
selecting individual informants was their familiarity with of the cases. 
All interviews were conducted in Norwegian; portions were subse-
quently translated into English by the lead author. Interview notes were 
collectively studied by the authors, employing directed qualitative 
content analysis (Frey et al., 1999; Hsieh and Shannon, 2005). Interview 
data were categorized into four main themes: process and context of 
learning; outcomes of the learning processes; measures implemented; 
and their impact on local avalanche preparedness. Categorizations and 
data analysis were reviewed collectively to ensure the validity of in-
terpretations and findings (Silverman, 2005). 
Informant 2 provided the coding of the 2017 case on implementa-
tion. In addition, one of the authors is currently employed at the 
Governor of Svalbard’s office. The knowledge and competence of this 
author were invaluable for completing this study, enabling access to all 
available reports on both cases and specific internal documents. This 
author undertook the initial round of coding of the measures taken in 
response to lessons identified in the 2015 case. 
3. Theory 
3.1. Organizational learning 
The concept of ‘organizational learning’ (Schön, 1983) entered or-
ganization studies in the late 1970s (Argyris and Schön, 1978, p. 111) 
and early 1980s (Hedberg, p. 22, 1981; Dery, 1982; Peters and 
Waterman, p. 110, 1982). However, understanding of the field is still 
‘vague and elusive’ (Gherardi, 1999). and there is no generally accepted 
definition of the concept or common analytical framework (Broekema, 
et al., 2017; Levy, 1994; Stern, 1997). The concept of organizational 
learning has been regarded as a metaphor: organizations do not literally 
‘learn’ in the same sense as individuals do (Levy, 1994, p. 287). Orga-
nizational learning occurs through individuals (Argyris and Schön, 
1978, p. 28) but is not a ‘cumulative result of their members’ learning’ 
(Hedberg, 1981, p. 6). Learning is a cycle that ‘involves a multistage 
process in which environmental feedback leads to individual learning, 
which leads to individual action to change organizational procedures, 
which leads to a change in organizational behaviour, which leads to 
further feedback’ (Levy, 1994, p.288). Importantly, it can be both formal 
(i.e. planned and structured) and informal (based on spontaneous 
interaction and knowledge sharing) (Janowicz-Panjaitan and Noorder-
haven, 2008). Our study understands the learning in question as ‘the 
acquisition of new knowledge and the translation of this knowledge into 
more effective organizational action’ (Broekema, et al., 2017). This 
approach recognizes that organizational learning has both a cognitive 
and an action dimension (Fiol and Lyles, 1985) and provides a bridge to 
the issue of implementation that we address further in the study. 
If learning is produced through both the detection and correction of 
error, we may conclude that ‘the lack of either or both inhibits learning’ 
(Argyris, 1976, p. 365). The detection of errors is associated with some 
sort of investigation following an event. Sound instrumental policy 
learning from disasters can be achieved through careful investigation 
following an event leading to ‘policy change as a result of careful 
investigation, assessment, and policy design’ (Birkland, 2009, p. 150). 
However, evaluating crisis management is challenging, as criteria 
against to measure success/failure are commonly lacking (McConnell, 
2011) and the processes are prone to subjectivity (Drennan, McConnell 
and Stark, 2015, p. 216). 
Studies have focused on measuring and categorizing organizational 
learning (Argyris and Schön, 1978; March, 1991; Miner and Mezias, 
1996). Argyris and Schön (1978), who distinguish between single-loop 
and double-loop learning, offered one of the most influential categori-
zations of organizational learning; learning is single-loop (hereafter: 
SLL) ‘[w]henever an error is detected and corrected without questioning 
or altering the underlying values of the system (be it individual, group, 
Table 1 
Informants and their affiliations.  
Code Organization 
INF 1 Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate (NVE) 
INF 2 Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate (NVE) 
INF 3 Longyearbyen Red Cross 
INF 4 Longyearbyen Local Government 
INF 5 Governor of Svalbard  
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intergroup, organizational or inter-organizational) (Argyris and Schön, 
1978, p.8). By contrast, ‘when errors are corrected by changing the 
governing values and then the actions’, double-loop learning (hereafter: 
DLL) occurs (Argyris, 2002, p.206). SLL works best when ‘the external 
environment changes slowly or when organizational premises and the 
environment are not in conflict. In times of rapid change, however, 
managers may feel an urge to undertake inquiries that question the 
organizational status quo’ (Deverell, 2009, p. 181). SLL is about doing 
the same things better, whereas DLL is a deeper form of learning that 
addresses ‘the root causes of the disaster, not the superficial causes’ 
(Choularton, 2001, p. 64). Error detection is connected to the ‘very 
norms which define effective performance’ (Argyris, and Schön, 1978, p. 
22). SLL and DLL learning are ‘not contrary to each other or mutually 
exclusive’ (Deverell, 2009, p. 185); in practice, there is a continuum 
between the two types of learning. However, in order to turn crisis 
management from being an efficiency problem to involving successful 
change of the whole system, there should be a balance between ‘doing 
things right’ (SLL), and ‘doing the right things’ (DLL) (Bakacsi, 2010, p. 
5). ‘Double-loop efforts may cause actors to overlook or forego useful 
single-loop lessons (van Duin, 1992 cited in Dekker and Hansén, 2004; 
Argyris and Schön, 1996)’. On the other hand, ‘placing a great deal of 
attention on single-loop lessons may cause organizations to miss out on 
valuable double-loop learning’ (Deverell, 2009, p. 185). Although the 
two strategies are intertwined, SLL has been held to be more common 
than DLL (Birkland, 2009), and ‘lessons that are more fundamental are 
learnt with difficulty’ (Choularton, 2001, p. 61). Moving from SLL to 
DLL is demanding, as there always is a trade-off between allocating re-
sources to the exploitation of existing practices or to the exploration of 
new alternatives (March 1991). However, achieving a level of learning 
which addresses the root causes of disasters is important, as failure to do 
so could lead to disaster (Miner and Mezias, 1996, p. 89). Far too often, 
extensive focus on SLL becomes the enemy of organizations seeking to 
solve many difficult problems (Argyris and Schön, 1978). 
3.2. Learning in crisis management 
Organizational learning in crisis management literature is a rela-
tively recent topic (Smith and Elliott, 2007). Therefore, our under-
standing of the relationship between crisis and learning is limited 
(Deverell, p. 179, 2009; Bakacsi, p.4, 2010), and research has high-
lighted the need for further empirical knowledge and theory building in 
the field (Broekema et al., 2017). In particular, limited attention has 
been paid to organizational and network learning (Moynihan, 2009). 
Post-crisis learning requires further investigation, ‘especially concerning 
the mechanisms and conditions through which individual lesson iden-
tification is transported into institutionalized lessons’ (Pursiainen, 2018, 
p. 155). Further research is needed, focusing on the barriers to and the 
facilitators of learning from post-crisis evaluations, to transfer new un-
derstandings into revised norms and behaviours within organizations 
(Elliott, 2009, p. 166). 
Organizational learning has been increasingly recognized as both a 
central process and a challenge in crisis management. Through learning, 
an organization can enhance its crisis-management capabilities and 
build resilience (Crichton, Ramsay, & Kelly, 2009). ‘[T]he literature on 
post-event learning is often characterized by an assumption that crises 
will lead to rational policy evaluations, clear-headed lessons and orga-
nizational improvements which will enhance future crisis management 
efforts’ (Drennan, McConnell and Stark, 2015, p. 193). However, the 
question ‘whether crises trigger systemic change or whether they fore-
stall’ it still remains open (Boin,‘t Hart, Stern and Sundelius, 2005, p. 
134). Disasters as ‘focusing events’ (Kingdon, 1995) open an opportu-
nity for organizational change and learning (Birkland, 2009; Stern, 
1997; Dekker and Hansén, 2004; Smith and Elliott, 2007). Yet this does 
not imply that learning always happens (Smith and Elliott, 2007, 
Deverell, 2009). Research has acknowledged that organizational 
learning from crises is complex and difficult (Stern, 1997; Smith and 
Elliott, 2007; Broekema, et al., 2017), highlighting that the limited 
learning capacity of policymakers and public organizations (Sabatier, 
1987; Levy, 1994; Stern, 1997; Deverell, 2009; Broekema, et al., 2017). 
Too often, learning processes ‘simply result in [‘fantasy documents’ 
(Clarke, 1999)] that [due to lack of instrumental utility] fail to address 
the real problems revealed by an event’ (Birkland, 2009, p. 155), turning 
the whole process into a ‘fantasy exercise’ (ibid, p. 154). We must bear in 
mind that organizational learning ‘in theory and in practice are some-
what different’ (Carley and Harrald, 1997, p. 326). 
Another aspect of organizational learning concerns the context of 
crisis management. All learning is context-dependent (Gherardi, 1998). 
The difficulty of effective learning increases with the rising complexity 
of the problem in question (Argyris, 1976, p. 365). Organizational 
learning from crises differs from organizational learning in routine sit-
uations (Moynihan, 2008a) as crisis brings in new dimensions. This is 
the ‘arduous paradox’ of crises: ‘the need for learning is regarded highest 
under circumstances in which it is most difficult to achieve’ (Dekker and 
Hansén, 2004, p. 212). The crisis context is characterized by consider-
able uncertainty and ambiguity, and high external pressure on public 
organizations, combined with political criticism and possible loss of 
institutional legitimacy. This makes it challenging to draw clear-cut 
lessons from events (Dekker and Hansén, 2004) and could lead to 
defensive and introverted organizational behaviour that may inhibit 
learning (Hermann, 1963). Crisis creates a sense of urgency: decisions 
have to be made in haste. This entails the risk of superficial learning 
‘without some sort of attempt to analyse the underlying problem’ 
(Birkland, 2009, p. 148). Moreover, crisis is often associated with po-
litical involvement, which will influence the learning capacity of public 
organizations. ‘Political attention may contribute to more fundamental 
reflection on the basic principles and values of an organization’ (i.e. to 
DLL) – but it may also ‘cause biases in the analysis of organizational 
failures’ (Dekker and Hansén, 2004, p. 132). This further implies that 
‘organizational learning in the public domain cannot be understood fully 
without considering its broader political environment’ (ibid., p. 212). 
Crisis management typically depends on more than one organization 
in terms of responding and learning (Moynihan, 2008b), which leads 
into the topic of network learning (NL) (Moynihan, 2009, p. 190). 
Network learning refers to learning by a group of organizations – with 
more or less formal or loosely structured relations (Moynihan, 2008a) – 
in a given context (Knight, 2002). This will bring together more 
knowledge and skills than a single organization (Brass et al., 2004), and 
provide greater potential for joint action (Kraatz, 1998). With network 
learning, the network is both the ‘learner’ and the learning context. 
Ultimately, network learning leads to changes in network attributes, like 
interaction, processes and structures, institutionalization of coordinated 
practices, implementation of shared views and interpretations (Dunford 
and Jones, 2000) and to improved network performance (Knight, 2002). 
NL should be distinguished from inter-organizational learning (IL), 
which is learning by individual organizations within a group of organi-
zations (network) (Knight, 2002, p. 435). IL has a focus on learning by 
the individual organization as the ‘learner’. However, the distinctions 
are subtle (Knight, 2002), and some view IL as synonymous with NL (see 
e.g. Dyer and Nobeoka, 2000). The point here is that we assume that 
how learning takes place – as intra- or inter-organizational, or through 
networks – will have an effect on the outcomes. 
3.3. Implementation 
The correction of errors is related to implementation of lessons 
identified (Argyris, 1976). It is not sufficient to identify lessons. In order 
to be ‘learned’, lesson must be implemented: errors must be corrected 
through systematic alteration of organizational behaviour (Deverell, 
2009, p. 180). This makes implementation a central issue in learning 
from crisis. Learning should not be taken for granted. There is a clear 
difference between lessons identified (organizational ability to declare 
new information or knowledge based on the crisis experience), and 
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lessons learned: the latter involves the ability to alter behaviour sys-
tematically in response to new knowledge (Deverell, 2009, p. 180). 
Research has focused on what affects learning from crises (Broekema 
et al., 2017), more specifically why organizations fail to learn (Argyris, 
1976; Stern, 1997; Smith and Elliott, 2007), and has identified organi-
zational inertia as the most obvious explanation of failures in post-crisis 
learning (Pursiainen, 2018, p. 156). Lessons identified too often remain 
mere declarations. ‘Efforts to learn after crisis often result in small-scale 
changes because reforms are constrained by institutional legacies and 
intransigent public policies’ (Drennan, McConnell and Stark, 2015, p. 
191). Political involvement is an important factor here. It may inhibit 
organizational learning (Argyris, 1976; Senge, 1990) but may also 
contribute to learning processes within the public sector (Dekker and 
Hansén, 2004). Elliott (2009) claims that when there is a gap between 
policy and practice, it may constrain opportunities for learning. On the 
other hand, the synergetic interaction of politics and practice may 
enhance learning. 
3.4. Analytical implications 
Thus, we can note a series of critical issues in the study of post-crisis 
learning. First, assessing learning requires including both the identifi-
cation of lessons and their implementation (Deverell, 2009): whether 
lessons identified remain ‘fantasy documents’ or are acted upon in 
practice. Second, do lessons identified address fundamental challenges 
and causes of unwanted events through double-loop learning – or are 
they directed primarily towards corrective actions within the estab-
lished system (Argyris and Schön, 1978)? Moreover, these forms of 
learning are not mutually exclusive (Deverell 2009): it is necessary in 
each case to consider the balance between lessons aimed at ‘doing things 
right’ and ‘doing the right things’ (Bakacsi, 2010). Third, post-crisis 
learning is difficult due to a range of factors that include the 
complexity of the crisis itself, political biases and time-pressure. Thus, it 
is important to identify how contextual factors, such as the political 
environment or the attributes of the case, facilitate or inhibit learning 
processes (Dekker and Hansén, 2004; Elliott, 2009). Fourth, how does 
the participation in and organization of the learning process affect its 
outcomes? This influences who learns what and how, and ultimately the 
effectiveness of learning in terms of identifying important lessons and 
implementing the right solutions. Here it is essential to distinguish 
among organizational, inter-organizational and network learning 
(Knight, 2002). 
4. Results 
4.1. Crisis management on Svalbard: Key actors and regulatory 
framework 
Norway’s crisis management system for avalanches is complex, 
involving multiple actors on Svalbard and on the mainland. Nationally, 
the Ministry of Justice and Public Security has overall responsibility for 
civil protection and emergency preparedness (DSB, 2016). The Polar 
Affairs Department of the Ministry deals, inter alia, with the adminis-
tration carried out by the Governor of Svalbard (hereafter: ‘Governor’), 
who is the Norwegian government’s highest ranking representative on 
Svalbard (Norwegian Ministry of Justice and Public Security, 1925, 
2019). The Governor is both Chief of Police and also has the authority 
corresponding to that of a County Governor on the mainland. The 
Governor has overall responsibility for the all work concerning public 
security, emergency preparedness and crisis management in Svalbard 
(Norwegian Ministry of Justice and Public Security, 2012). To gain an 
overview of risk and vulnerability, the Governor is to prepare a risk and 
vulnerability analysis for Svalbard (Svalbard ROS) in close cooperation 
with other actors. The Governor shall also follow up the work of Long-
yearbyen Local Government (hereafter: LLG) on public security through 
supervision, exercises and advice (Norwegian Ministry of Justice and 
Public Security, 2016). The Governor also heads the Preparedness 
Council established as a forum between all central public, voluntary and 
private organisations that contribute to emergency preparedness and 
crisis management. The Preparedness Council discusses issues based on 
risks and vulnerabilities, and will coordinate response between partici-
pating organisations during a crisis. 
Rescue operations on Svalbard are conducted in collaboration be-
tween public bodies, non-governmental organizations and private ac-
tors, through the Local Rescue Coordination Centre (hereafter: LRCC 
Svalbard). LRCC Svalbard consists of all major actors involved in rescue 
operations; LLG, Fire and Rescue, Telenor Svalbard (telecom), Long-
yearbyen Hospital, Store Norske Spitsbergen Kulkompani AS, the SAR 
helicopter service Lufttransport and the Longyearbyen Red Cross (Nor-
wegian Ministry of Justice and Public Security, 2016). The LRCC has an 
Emergency Response Council lead by the Governor that coordinates 
local response during unwanted events (Norwegian Ministry of Justice 
and Public Security, 2015). The Council consists of representatives from 
research institutions, companies, the Longyearbyen Red Cross, the 
Church, and Longyearbyen Hospital, and functions as an arena for dis-
cussing and exchanging information on civil protection and emergency 
preparedness (Norwegian Ministry of Justice and Public Security, 
2016). The Joint Rescue Coordination Centre of Northern Norway 
(JRCC NN) located in Bodø on the mainland, leads all maritime and 
large-scale rescue operations (Norwegian Ministry of Justice and Public 
Security, 2016). 
Longyearbyen Local Government (LLG) functions largely in the same 
way as a mainland municipality. It is responsible for working ‘system-
atically and holistically with social security work across sectors, with a 
view to reducing the risk of loss of life or damage to health, the envi-
ronment and material assets’ ((Norwegian Ministry of Justice and Public 
Security, 2016), para. 2). This includes risk and vulnerability analysis, 
area- and contingency planning, and having a programme for training 
and exercises. LLG is also responsible for safeguarding people during 
evacuations. The Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate 
(hereafter: NVE) is responsible for mapping the risk of landslides and 
floods, and warning in case of avalanches. From 2013, NVE has re-
sponsibility for avalanche prevention in Svalbard, providing expertise 
and resources for mapping, area planning, protection, monitoring, 
warning and emergency preparedness. Since 2015 NVE has been 
responsible for the avalanche warning system on Svalbard. NVE also acts 
as an adviser to the Governor and LLG on avalanche preparedness and 
crisis management. Emergency preparedness in Longyearbyen also re-
lies on the competence and capacity of the Longyearbyen Red Cross, in 
terms of preparedness and in response capacity. Further, Longyearbyen 
has an emergency medical hospital with 24-hour emergency prepared-
ness, a branch of the University Hospital of North Norway (2019). 
Longyearbyen Hospital provides health services during emergencies 
(Norwegian Ministry of Health and Care Services, 2015). 
4.2. December 2015 avalanche 
4.2.1. Evaluation process and lessons identified 
The evaluation of the December 2015 avalanche was organized as a 
project and conducted by representatives from the Norwegian Direc-
torate for Civil Protection (DSB), the Norwegian Police University Col-
lege and the Joint Rescue Coordination Centre Southern Norway (DSB, 
2016). The involvement of DSB was based on an initiative from the LLG 
(INF 4). The quality of the evaluation report was ensured by a reference 
group consisting of representatives of all the actors involved. The 
comprehensive evaluation process was based on a qualitative approach 
using interview and document analysis as key methods of data collec-
tion. The evaluation group conducted interviews with representatives of 
19 authorities, from both Svalbard and the mainland. In addition, the 
relevant regulatory framework, laws and regulations, guidelines, re-
ports, logs, risk assessments, contingency plans and scientific literature 
were studied. Based on this evaluation, a set of lessons learned was 
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identified, and categorized according to different response tasks (see 
Table 2; DSB, 2016). 
The evaluation report identified 27 lessons (Table 2), categorized 
according to how they relate to the functions of emergency response; 
warning (L1), response (L2–12), crisis communication (L13–15), first 
aid and crisis medicine (L16–17), evacuated, affected persons and rel-
atives (L18–20), role of lead ministry (L21–22), avalanche prevention 
(L23–27). Lessons vary in scope from specific roles and responsibilities 
to the establishment of an avalanche warning system; six concern pre-
vention and preparedness regarding future avalanches (L1, 23–27). 
Of the lessons identified, eleven concern defining, delineating or 
formalizing the roles and responsibilities of the actors and how they are 
to interact in the avalanche preparedness system on Svalbard (L2–5, 8, 
10, 11, 18, 19, 24, 27). This applies to the role of the Ministry of Justice 
and Civil Protection, NVE, JRCC NN, the Governor of Svalbard, LLG, and 
consultancy companies. In many cases it implies acting upon already 
existing rules and regulations, clarifying or delineating responsibilities, 
or establishing new routines. In other cases, these roles and re-
sponsibilities need to be defined formally in the context of Svalbard. As 
was confirmed by informants (INF 1–5), there was a perceived need to 
establish clear roles and responsibilities for avalanche preparedness and 
response on Svalbard. 
A further set of issues concerns crisis communication, warning and 
notification (L6, 7, 13–16) and situational reporting (L8, 9, 12, 21, 22) – 
internally within the local warning system and externally to emergency 
actors and the public. The need to dedicate resources and establish 
routines also applies to other functions of the emergency response sys-
tem (L12, 17, 20 26). In sum, the suggested changes reflect the need to 
establish the building blocks of an effective avalanche preparedness 
system equipped with a formal structure with dedicated resources and 
established procedures. 
Many of the lessons focused on formal roles and responsibilities; 
others aimed to establish avalanche preparedness in Longyearbyen from 
2016 onwards. L1 addresses the need to establish preparedness plans 
and check-lists for local avalanche warnings. L 23 raises the need for 
preparedness actors to follow up on findings from the risk and vulner-
ability analyses. Finally, L 25 establishes the need to establish moni-
toring procedures for avalanche danger in Longyearbyen as a basis for a 
local avalanche warning and preparedness system. These lessons iden-
tified have triggered comprehensive responses, as they are being acted 
upon and implemented. 
4.2.2. Implementation 
Since the avalanche in 2015 there has been a strong focus on 
avalanche prevention, preparedness and response on Svalbard (INF 
1–5), and many implementation efforts have been initiated to follow up 
the lessons identified. All 11 lessons concerning defining the roles and 
responsibilities of the actors in the avalanche preparedness system on 
Svalbard (L2–5, 8, 10, 11, 18, 19, 24, 27) have now been formally 
implemented through plans, checklists, and regular meetings assigning 
roles and responsibilities. The evaluation report also identified a series 
of challenges related to crisis communication and situational reporting 
(DSB, 2016), leading to the adoption of new infrastructure and pro-
cedures (Table 2). 
The most extensive measures taken have concerned L1, L23 and L26. 
In 2016, NVE conducted a hazard assessment of avalanche paths around 
Longyearbyen (NVE, 2016). This was based on gathering local expert 
knowledge about past events and the natural conditions (INF 2), and 
showed that portions of Longyearbyen were in areas with high 
avalanche risk. In addition, preparedness plans and checklists have been 
developed for local avalanche warnings. 
Several measures have been implemented to follow up on risk and 
vulnerability analysis, in terms of prevention and preparedness (L23). 
Some measures are temporary; others are permanent. Preventive 
structures have been built in the Lia area, and several residents of other 
particularly exposed areas have been allocated new housing units in 
Table 2 
Lessons identified and measures implemented following the 2015 avalanche 
(unofficial translation).  
No. Lessons identified Measures implemented 
1 Emergency preparedness actors 
should establish standard operating 
procedures to handle warnings of 
extreme weather. These should be 
based on existing knowledge of 
relevant risk areas based on previous 
experiences, thereby improving the 
basis to consider all relevant risk 
factors in handling warnings of 
extreme weather. 
Preparedness plan and checklists 
have been developed for local 
avalanche warnings in the form of 
hazard assessment for exposed 
buildings in Longyearbyen. Plan and 
checklists are continuously evaluated 
and revised. 
2 In emergency operations on 
Svalbard it is important to use 
established structures and routines, 
so that roles and responsibilities are 
clear among the participating actors 
at all times. 
This has been a recurrent theme 
during exercises since 2015. It has 
proven challenging, as regulations 
are not always adaptable to the 
structure of the emergency 
management agencies in Svalbard. 
3 The use of LRCC and its Rescue 
Management Council, according to 
the operation and their mandates, 
provides a basis for operational 
(tactical) and strategic assessments 
and decisions. It is important that 
the role of the Rescue Management 
Council is clear. 
The Governor is working to clarify 
the role of the Rescue Management 
Council. A central problem is that 
many emergency management 
agencies in Svalbard lack the capacity 
to operate simultaneously on the 
operational and strategical level 
during a crisis. 
4 The Rescue Management Council 
should be involved at the strategic 
level during major incidents (also 
between incidents). 
See nos. 2 and 3. Additionally, the 
Rescue Management Council meets 4 
times per year, as does the 
Preparedness Council. 
5 JRCC NN should take responsibility 
to coordinate support from the 
mainland during rescue operations. 
Close communication with JRCC NN 
will provide support for LRCC 
Svalbard. 
The Governor and JRCC NN 
collaborate and communicate closely 
during rescue operations. Routines 
for situational reports have been 
established. Contact meetings and 
desktop exercises are held yearly. The 
agencies have extensive contact on 
other arenas. 
6 Emergency response actors on 
Svalbard should consider 
developing joint warning- and 
communication channels. 
There is a common channel on 
Sysselnett (radio communication) for 
police, LLG (fire corps), 
Longyearbyen hospital and the Red 
Cross. This initiative was initiated pre 
2015. 
7 The Governor should consider 
acquiring a system for rapid 
notification of relevant internal and 
external resources. 
DSB-CIM (Crisis and Incident 
Management Software) has been 
established as a tool for warning 
distribution and rapid notification, 
both internally and externally. 
8 Situational reporting based on 
established guidelines should be 
conducted in demanding emergency 
situations, to contribute to a joint 
overview and situational awareness 
and that relevant issues are raised to 
responsible authorities. 
Situational reporting to the national 
Emergency Support Unit, JRCC NN 
and the National Police Directorate 
(POD) (cc DSB) has been integrated 
into checklists for major accident 
scenarios (i.e. Governor’s 
contingency plans). 
9 The implementation of CIM, as used 
by local government and the 
Ministry of Justice, can contribute to 
effective situational reporting 
between local government, the 
Governor and Ministry of Justice. 
CIM was implemented by the 
Governor in 2018. Relevant 
personnel have received training in 
the module for situation reports. 
Keeping logs and reporting 
throughout the crisis has received 
increased focus. 
10 NVE should clarify its role as 
scientific/professional coordinator 
as the State directorate for 
avalanches. 
This has been settled after extensive 
contact between the Governor, LLG 
and NVE. The role of the NVE is 
clearly defined in The Governor’s 
avalanche preparedness plans and 
checklists. 
11 The delineation and coordination of 
responsibilities with NGI and other 
consultancies should be clarified. 
See no. 10. Skred AS1 is the primary 
consultancy agency per 2019. 
12 By dedicating and training internal 
personnel who are not active 
otherwise in the rescue operations, 
Governor’s employees who are not 
police personnel have received 
(continued on next page) 
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other parts of Longyearbyen. 
The 2015 avalanche, and NVE’s subsequent avalanche hazard as-
sessments, triggered the initiation of a local warning and evacuation 
system in Longyearbyen. In early 2015, there was a trial period for a 
regional avalanche warning system for the Nordenskiöld Land area of 
Svalbard (including Longyearbyen). The regional avalanche warning 
system was established on a permanent basis from 2016 onwards. 
A local warning system for Longyearbyen was established by NVE in 
the direct aftermath of the December 2015 avalanche with the assistance 
of the University Centre in Svalbard (UNIS), LLG and the Governor of 
Svalbard (INF 1, INF 3). This was a follow-up of L25. The local avalanche 
warning system continued under NVE auspices, including local moni-
toring, avalanche observers, and local avalanche danger assessments. 
From 2019, the responsibility for the daily avalanche assessments was 
taken over by Skred AS. The current warning and evacuation system is a 
result of continuous evaluation, revision and dialogue between the 
agencies responsible. NVE, LLG, the Governor of Svalbard and UNIS are 
all involved and have developed and coordinated their organizational 
preparedness plans and check lists. Skred AS coordinates evaluations 
following each weather-cycle indicating a yellow alert level, which al-
lows for exchange of experience and continuous revision of existing 
systems and routines. 
The Svalbard Preparedness Council also has an important role as an 
arena for coordinating the efforts of emergency management agencies. It 
is particularly important with regard to information sharing, and works 
as a platform for discussion on risk areas identified for Svalbard. The 
forum has also been central in the process of implementing the measures 
identified measures in the DSB report. 
4.3. February 2017 avalanche 
4.3.1. Evaluation process, lessons identified and implementation 
The evaluation process was conducted by experts from the 
Table 2 (continued ) 
No. Lessons identified Measures implemented 
for writing logs and situational 
reporting and such, one can ensure 
continuity in these functions using 
emergency personnel. 
training in the various CIM modules 
(log, situational report, etc.). 
13 Emergency actors on Svalbard 
should to a larger extent prioritize 
public information in English. 
Information concerning preparedness 
and crisis situations is always 
published on Governor’s web pages 
in English as well as Norwegian 
(Governor’s web pages). 
14 Emergency actors with 
communication responsibilities on 
Svalbard should formalize 
agreements of support with internal 
and external resources to ensure 
capacity during lengthy operations. 
Governor and LLG collaborate on 
producing and publishing 
information online. Governor and 
The University Centre in Svalbard 
(UNIS) have formalized an 
agreement on mutual support on 
crisis communication. JRCC-NN 
provides support during large-scale 
events and whenever it is necessary 
15 Emergency actors with 
communication responsibilities on 
Svalbard should establish and 
maintain dialogue and cooperation 
also on a daily basis. This will 
contribute to cooperation during 
crisis. 
See no. 14 
16 It is recommended that the 
emergency services on Svalbard in 
cooperation with state authorities 
assess whether crisis communication 
is sufficient. 
Governor, Longyearbyen hospital, 
fire rescue services and Red Cross 
have a common channel on Sysselnett 
(radio communication). 
Additionally, steps are being taken to 
develop a common log in CIM for 
Svalbard’s emergency management 
agencies. 
17 There is a need to upgrade 
equipment inventory both at 
Longyearbyen hospital and at the 
University Hospital of North Norway 
(UNN) Tromsø, in addition to 
upgrading some medical equipment 
at the Longyearbyen hospital. 
Medical equipment has been 
stationed in Longyearbyen to allow 
for more rapid transportation from 
Tromsø during an acute crisis. The 
modernization of non-medical 
equipment has been put on hold, 
awaiting the allocation of civil 
defence resources in Longyearbyen. 
18 Clarify the responsibility for psycho- 
social preparedness and following 
up victims and relatives. 
This responsibility lies with LLG, and 
is part of preparedness plans and 
checklists. 
19 All relevant professionals in 
Longyearbyen should be part of a 
formalized psycho-social emergency 
team. 
The psychosocial emergency team 
consists of qualified representatives 
from LLG and Church on Svalbard. 
20 There is a need for a system to map 
and follow up persons in need of 
long-term psycho-social follow-up, 
including participants in the 
emergency response operation as 
well as others not directly involved. 
This is not the responsibility of LLG, 
Governor or other authorities on 
Svalbard. No implementation action 
taken. 
21 On incidents on Svalbard, the lead 
ministry/Emergency Support Unit 
should follow up relevant actors to 
ensure inclusion in situational 
reporting. 
There is increased focus on 
situational reporting both from KSE 
and Governor, Routines for 
Governor’s reporting are formalized 
through plans and check lists. 
22 The Emergency Support Unit, JRCC 
NN and any others emergency 
centres should clarify reporting 
routines for incidents on Svalbard. 
The standard procedure is situational 
reports from Governor to KSE, JRCC 
NN and POD, cc DSB. 
23 Preparedness actors on Svalbard 
should to a greater degree follow up 
on risk and vulnerability analysis. 
Where probabilities cannot be 
reduced, mitigating measures 
should be implemented. 
There has been a focus on 
implementing permanent and 
temporary avalanche prevention 
measures, evacuation routines, area 
planning etc. The Svalbard risk and 
vulnerability analysis (SvalbardROS) 
is followed up through Preparedness 
Council meetings. 
24 Relevant actors, also at the state 
level, should clarify responsibility 
for avalanche prevention in 
avalanche-prone areas in 
Longyearbyen. 
Responsibility for avalanche 
prevention measures lies with LLG.  
Table 2 (continued ) 
No. Lessons identified Measures implemented 
25 Monitoring procedures should be 
established for avalanche danger in 
Longyearbyen, with possibilities for 
warning and evacuation. 
A local avalanche warning system 
was established in 2016 by NVE in 
cooperation with LLG and the 
Governor. UNIS conducts field 
observations that are shared on www. 
regobs.no. Based on observational 
data and local weather forecasts, 
Skred AS conducts daily local 
avalanche danger assessments. If the 
assessment indicates an increased 
risk of avalanches, Skred AS conducts 
a detailed risk assessment. UNIS, 
Governor, NVE and LLG all 
participate in the system and have 
developed relevant plans and 
checklists. 
26 There should be a system that 
ensures experience- and knowledge 
transfer when organizational and 
personnel changes take place, both 
at the local government and 
Governor’s office. 
There is a system of 2-week overlap 
between old and new employees at 
the Governor established prior to 
2015. There is also greater focus on 
formal documentation e.g. in CIM 
and other databases. All unwanted 
events are evaluated. LLG experience 
transfer and training exists, but has 
limitations (INF 4). 
27 The Ministry of Justice and Civil 
Protection should to a larger extent 
cooperate with DSB to clarify 
requirements and expectations 
regarding the Governor’s follow-up 
of the County Governors Civil 
Protection Instructions 
The Ministry of Justice and Public 
Security has emphasized the 
Governor’s responsibilities and role 
in civil protection and preparedness 
since the 2015 avalanche, e.g. as 
reflected in the Ministry’s letter of 
allocation to the Governor.  
1 Skred AS is an independent consultancy that offers advice on issues related 
to floods and landslides. 
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Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate (NVE) and the 
Norwegian Geotechnical Institute (NGI) (NVE, 2017). They either were 
part of the local warning system or had substantial experience and 
knowledge of the local conditions (INF 2). The focus of evaluation was 
on the event itself and the avalanche warning preceding it. The key 
purpose of the evaluation was to learn from the accident in order to 
achieve better local warnings in future. 
The evaluation report identified 15 lessons (see Table 3). In line with 
the focus of this evaluation, all were related to the functioning of the 
local warning system. As such the scope was narrow in comparison to 
the evaluation of the 2015 avalanche. 
Of the lessons identified, six had a focus on how specific weather or 
other natural conditions create uncertainties for the warning system, in 
assessing danger levels and the measures to be adopted (L1–3, 5, 7, 8). 
Five of the lessons identified concern how forecasters and the NVE/ 
warning system should consider, communicate and handle uncertainties 
(L4, 9–12). Lesson 6 confirms that local observation functions well as a 
basis for assessing local avalanche danger. Lesson 13 is comprehensive 
in that it recommends the consideration of building infrastructure for 
meteorological observations. The report concludes that, based on iden-
tified uncertainties and local risk acceptance, one should expect more 
recommended evacuations, and that in many cases there will be no 
avalanches (L14, 15). 
Importantly, five of the lessons identified did not recommend any 
further action. Lessons 6 and 7 are confirmations of practice and expe-
rience drawing on local observers. Lesson 9 identifies the error in not 
considering uncertainty in data-basis and judgement when assessing 
avalanche danger. Lessons 14 and 15 provide conclusions and expec-
tations for future practice of recommending evacuations, rather than 
offering a basis for future action. 
4.3.2. Implementation 
As noted above, eleven of the lessons identified in the report 
following the 2017 avalanche concerned uncertainties in assessing 
danger levels. In many cases this is a question of how the forecasters are 
to consider and handle specific factors that create uncertainties when 
assessing danger levels and the appropriateness of measures. In the 
implementation of six of the lessons identified (1–5, 8) new practices are 
implemented as ‘rules of thumb’ or raising awareness when forecasters 
are to consider uncertainty when assessing danger levels. There is no 
further formalization beyond being identified by the evaluation report 
as such. It is assumed in these cases that the evaluation report will be 
applied as a basis for future practice (INF 2). In four cases, the lessons 
identified have triggered changes in organizational practice. A checklist 
and new format for forecasts have been formally introduced to 
communicate uncertainties in the published avalanche warnings (L10). 
Practices for peer-reviewing local forecasts have been tightened, in that 
a peer with local expert knowledge should always conduct the review 
(L11). This was however not formalized beyond the report and estab-
lishing a new practice. Further, in cases of professional disagreement 
between forecaster and reviewer, a third person should become 
involved; or, if not possible, the most conservative assessment should 
stand (L12). This new practice was implemented as a new routine, 
however, without being formalized through written routines (INF 2). 
Finally, Lesson 13 recommended the establishment of new stations for 
meteorological observation. This has partially been implemented by 
more frequent observations (Sukkertoppen, Gruvefjellet, Huset), 
measuring poles in Lia, and meteorological station at SvalSat (INF 2). 
However, camera stations have not been established, partly for reasons 
of funding and partly because responsibility for the local warning system 
has been transferred from NVE to LLG (INF 2). Implementation of the 
lessons identified was considerably facilitated by the participation of 
central actors in the local avalanche system in the evaluation process 
(INF 1, 2). 
Table 3 
Lessons identified and measures implemented following the 2017 avalanche.  
No. Lessons identified Measures implemented 
1 Weather conditions indicated 
increased probability of an avalanche 
in the Lia area of Longyearbyen. In 
such situations, evacuation should be 
recommended unless the local 
warning system can demonstrate 
with a high degree of certainty that 
this is not necessary. 
Rule of thumb. Not formalized 
beyond report. Raise awareness of 
such situations. 
2 Summits where there have not been 
previous avalanches should be 
included in assessments of avalanche 
paths that may pose a threat to 
buildings. 
Rule of thumb. Not formalized 
beyond report. Less weight on local 
experience when making 
assessments. 
3 Snow and weather conditions created 
conditions for the avalanche to travel 
far. Avalanches can occur after 
limited precipitation and strong wind 
in Longyearbyen. To cover most 
situations with heightened danger 
levels it is important to have good 
observations and that uncertainty is 
assessed if observations are missing. 
Rule of thumb. Not formalized 
beyond report. Under uncertainty or 
lack of data, opt for ‘worst case’. 
4 Assessments of avalanche run-out 
zones are challenging in 
Longyearbyen. There are small safety 
margins. To provide larger margins of 
error, it should be assumed that 
avalanches may reach buildings. 
Rule of thumb. Not formalized 
beyond report. Raising awareness of 
the issue. A confirmation of what 
was already known, though not 
formalized. 
5 Small avalanches that gain speed can 
reach far and cause substantial 
damages. Danger-level, avalanche 
size, and weather conditions 
considered typical of avalanches are 
not definitive 
Rule of thumb. Not formalized 
beyond report. Not all factors need 
to be in place for an avalanche to 
occur – e.g., snowfall is not required, 
wind may suffice. 
6 The local observers provide a good 
basis for assessments of local 
avalanche danger. The observations 
were frequent enough and provided a 
good basis for the local warnings/ 
forecasts. 
Confirmation of practice 
7 Observers experience that the 
amount of fresh snow available for 
transport often has greater effect than 
reflected in forecasts. 
Confirmation of lesson identified No 
5. 
8 Climatic conditions in Longyearbyen 
make it challenging to forecast 
avalanche danger. To identify most 
dangerous situations, it is important 
to consider uncertainty. A changing 
climate and previous snow and 
avalanche history do not necessarily 
provide a full account of the current 
situation. It is important to operate 
with a sufficient margin of error in 
the future. 
Rule of thumb. Not formalized 
beyond report. Changing climatic 
conditions imply that historical 
experience is not as useful any more 
as a basis for assessments. Hereafter, 
‘All terrain that is steep enough must 
be assessed in the situation’ (INF 2) 
9 The local assessment was sufficiently 
accurate to provide the technical 
information necessary for the 
decision whether to evacuate. In this 
case uncertainties regarding 
available data and possible errors of 
judgement were not taken 
sufficiently into consideration. 
Error identified. Reference to lessons 
other lessons identified on 
uncertainty. 
10 Local forecasts should to a larger 
extent communicate uncertainties in 
the assessments and data. A checklist 
should be introduced to highlight 
uncertainty. 
Checklist introduced and new 
format for forecasting, including 
communicating uncertainty. 
11 The local warning system was peer- 
reviewed by other forecasters and in 
communication with observers, but 
more systematic routines should be 
established to ensure this. 
Established practice tightened. 
There should always be two 
forecasters with local knowledge. 
Forecaster 2 may be internal or 
external to NVE. 
12 
(continued on next page) 
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5. Discussion 
5.1. Process and participation 
The evaluation processes of the avalanches in 2015 and 2017 
differed considerably. After the 2015 avalanche all emergency pre-
paredness actors in Svalbard had their own internal learning processes 
in addition to the process related to the evaluation report by the Nor-
wegian Directorate for Civil Protection, DSB (DSB, 2016; INF1-5). In 
addition, the Longyearbyen community was involved through public 
meetings where findings from reports were presented and discussed. The 
evaluation report concentrated on multiple functions and phases of 
emergency management, including warning, response, communication, 
crisis medicine and prevention (DSB, 2016). As noted, 16 of the lessons 
identified had a focus on the system level (multiple actors) of the 
avalanche preparedness system; 12 of the lessons identified concerned 
intra-organizational issues, the roles and responsibilities of individual 
actors in particular. The scope of the lessons identified reflected the need 
to establish an operative avalanche preparedness system for 
Longyearbyen. 
The evaluation following the 2017 avalanche (NVE, 2017) was 
narrower in scope, with the focus on the warning system as such. 
Participation in the process was limited to the Norwegian Water Re-
sources and Energy Directorate (NVE), plus one expert from the Nor-
wegian Geotechnical Institute (NGI), although there was also some 
community participation through public meetings. Of the 15 lessons 
identified, 5 had a system-level focus (multiple actors), while 11 had an 
intra-organizational scope (NVE, 2017). Implementation of all the les-
sons identified except L13 (monitoring infrastructure) was under the 
NVE mandate. 
Experiences from learning across organizations have varied after the 
events, according to our respondents. The Governor of Svalbard, Long-
yearbyen Local Government (LLG) and the NVE all highlight the 
continuous learning and development among participants in the local 
avalanche preparedness system (INF 1, 2, 4, 5). This is facilitated by 
their participation in joint meetings during planning processes, the 
emergency preparedness council, and other arenas where avalanche 
preparedness is on the agenda. However, our informant from the Red 
Cross (INF 3) mentioned the lack of joint learning processes after the 
avalanches, noting that the actors had extensive intra-organizational 
learning processes in addition to the DSB-led process, but that there 
was no joint learning process for emergency preparedness actors in 
Longyearbyen in the aftermath of the 2015 avalanche (INF3). This 
shows how learning among organizations can be both facilitated and 
inhibited by hierarchies and rights of participation (Moynihan, 2008b), 
and makes clear the need to analyse both formal and informal arenas 
where learning takes place (Janowicz-Panjaitan and Noorderhaven, 
2008). As Governor of Svalbard, the LLG and the NVE participate in 
formal arenas based on their mandates as public authorities, they can 
have more continuous inter-organizational dialogue and be involved in 
learning processes. By contrast, the Red Cross is not represented in all 
these public processes and may thus be excluded from learning- 
processes there. Over time, such differences in actor mandates, roles 
and participation across various arenas may create uncertainties (Moy-
nihan, 2009), as actors within the same system may not learn the same 
lessons and or share the same understandings (Dunford and Jones, 
2000). 
5.2. Single- and double-loop learning 
The post-2015 learning process was a comprehensive process with a 
broad scope. Our review of the lessons identified shows that there was a 
need to establish formal roles and functions for avalanche preparedness. 
In some cases, these roles and functions had to be adapted to the specific 
regulatory framework for Svalbard; in others, they simply had to be 
activated. These are typical cases of single-loop learning (Argyris and 
Schön, 1978), where participating actors are seeking to ‘do things right’ 
(Bakacsi, 2010, p.5) and thereby improve performance. 
However, it is also clear that the post-2015 learning process had a 
strong double-loop learning dimension in redefining the risk picture and 
establishing the need for avalanche preparedness: ‘doing the right 
things’ (Bakasci 2010, p.5). During the 1990s and 2000s, research at the 
University Centre in Svalbard (UNIS) and the NGI had highlighted the 
danger of avalanches in the mountainside above Lia; and the mountain 
area had been monitored (DSB, 2016). Moreover, there had been 
monitoring of the mountainside above Lia during the 1990s (DSB, 
2016). However, this was later discontinued (INF3). The question of a 
regional avalanche warning system had been on the agenda for Svalbard 
ever since such a system was established on mainland Norway in 2013 
(INF 1; DSB, 2016). However, the perceived need on Svalbard had been 
moderate, and in 2014 the Ministry of Justice had informed local actors 
that flood and avalanche warning on Svalbard would not be prioritized 
(DSB, 2016). Nevertheless, a two-week test of an avalanche warning 
system, including local observers, had been conducted in late winter 
2015, and a new one was planned for 2016 (INF 1, 3). Thus, avalanches 
were on the agenda prior to the 2015 disaster, but did not have high 
priority (INF1, 2, 4). It is not unknown for disasters to trigger action 
(Kingdon, 1995; Birkland, 2009). This happened on Svalbard, as a local 
avalanche warning system was established as a crisis measure in 
December 2015; the regional warning system for Nordenskiöld Land was 
permanently established from 2016. Due partly to the level of avalanche 
danger, and partly to the multiple measures implemented (evacuations, 
road-closure, spatial planning, housing policies, etc.), the issue of 
avalanche prevention and preparedness has remained high on the 
agenda since then. Thus, the learning process had a double-loop learning 
effect not only on avalanche preparedness, but also for a range of other 
policy areas, including housing, planning and infrastructure. 
As noted, the aim of the NVE evaluation after the 2017 avalanche 
was rather narrowly defined (NVE, 2017). It was to identify and 
implement lessons to improve the local avalanche warning system 
(INF1, 2) – single-loop learning (Argyris and Schön, 1978). Further, 
participants in the evaluation were actors directly involved in the 
avalanche warning system, which can explain the notable lack of 
formalization as regards implementation of most of the lessons identi-
fied. Most lessons identified were implemented as ‘rules of thumb’ for 
future practice, with no written procedures beyond the evaluation 
report itself. While this may be understandable, as the forecasters were 
Table 3 (continued ) 
No. Lessons identified Measures implemented 
In situations (not the case in week 8) 
where there is professional 
disagreement between forecaster and 
peer reviewer, a third person should 
be involved. If this is not possible, the 
most conservative scenario should be 
applied. 
New practice. Not formalized 
beyond report. Has been followed up 
in practice. 
13 More stations with meteorological 
observations should be considered. In 
addition, observations of powder 
snow in loading areas is important. 
New monitoring infrastructure. 
Partially implemented. Various 
actors have responsibility for 
implementation. Depends on 
resources and perceived need for 
new infrastructure. 
14 Local warning system assessments 
and communication of uncertainty 
may lead to an increase in 
recommendations to evacuate. 
Expected consequences of lessons 
learned 
15 One should expect evacuations of 
populated areas. During most 
evacuations there will be no 
avalanches. That does not imply that 
the forecast is wrong, but that 
uncertainties and local risk 
acceptance have been taken into 
consideration. 
Expected consequences of lessons 
learned  
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part of the evaluation process (NVE, 2017), it also gives rise to questions 
regarding how individual (or group) learning could be converted into 
organizational learning (Levy, 1994), by setting up new measures and 
procedures. When learning becomes dependent on informal routines 
and institutional memory, in a society like that on Svalbard with its high 
population turn-over, this may entail substantial vulnerabilities. More-
over, in 2019 the local avalanche warning system was taken over by 
Skred AS. Although the 2017 NVE evaluation report was an attachment 
in the tendering process, and there are expectations that Skred AS will 
take into consideration the lessons identified, this has not been 
formalized directly (INF 2). 
There has also been an element of double-loop learning in the post- 
2017 learning process. The evaluation of the 2015 avalanche (DSB, 
2016) had called on actors to establish avalanche preparedness based on 
existing local knowledge and experience (L1). The NVE gathered data 
and conducted a series of interviews to gather information on avalanche 
paths and natural conditions, to provide the basis for the prevention and 
preparedness measures to be implemented, and, not least, the local 
avalanche warning system. This shows high reliance on historical data 
and experience as a basis for local avalanche warnings (INF 2). However, 
in 2017, the NVE concluded that historical experience was not reliable 
as assumed (L8). The avalanches in 2015 and 2017 had demonstrated 
that what had been ‘known’ to be true, based on historical experience, 
was not longer so. Hereafter ‘…all terrain that is steep enough must be 
assessed…’ (INF 2), rather than relying on known avalanche paths. With 
the onset of climate change, the warning system could not be built on 
historical experience, or known weather-patterns: it would have to be 
based on dealing with uncertainty, as reflected in practically all lessons 
identified in the evaluation report (NVE, 2017). Thus, while the vast 
majority of lessons identified and implemented were typically single- 
loop learning (Argyris and Schön, 1978), they were based more funda-
mentally on a process of double-loop learning as to the basis of 
avalanche preparedness on Svalbard. This was also reflected in the fact 
that new assessments for Lia and Sukkertoppen were conducted in 2018 
(NVE, 2018), only two years after the previous ones (NVE, 2016). 
5.3. Contextual factors 
In the aftermath of the disastrous avalanche in 2015 there was 
controversy over the lack of monitoring and preparedness. Also after the 
avalanche in 2017 it was questioned why evacuation orders had not 
been issued. This might easily have led to a situation where conflicts 
regarding questions of liability, costs, bureaucratic turf-wars, political 
blame-games, etc., could have obstructed learning processes. Research 
has shown that many such factors may hamper learning processes dur-
ing and in the aftermath of crisis (Dekker and Hansén, 2004; Birkland, 
2009). However, this does not seem to have been the case with the 
Svalbard avalanches. Instead, the events served to mobilize public 
awareness, political will and funding (INF 3). This provided a context 
where participating organizations were willing to learn and undergo 
organizational change, as shown by the evaluation processes and their 
follow-up. 
Crisis evaluations often suffer from lack of evaluation criteria, and 
from subjective interpretations (Drennan et al., 2015). One reason why 
the evaluation process in 2015 could be so comprehensive was that the 
lessons identified and evaluation criteria could partly be based on the 
system for avalanche warning and preparedness already developed on 
mainland Norway (INF 1). Many of the measures proposed in the 2015 
evaluation report (DSB, 2016) were based on solutions formally estab-
lished by laws and regulations and/or established in regions of mainland 
Norway that had operative avalanche preparedness systems. This made 
it possible for crisis measures to be implemented in the short-term in 
2015/16, while a more comprehensive evaluation and learning process 
could be set in motion. This avoided a situation where political pressures 
could have made it necessary to take action without any analysis of the 
underlying problem (Birkland, 2009). 
5.4. Implementation 
Simply identifying lessons from unwanted events does not in itself 
ensure that necessary measures will be implemented (Deverell, 2009). 
Too often, whether due to organizational inertia, institutional legacies 
or other factors, post-crisis learning leads to inadequate, small-scale 
changes (Drennan et al., 2015; Pursiainen, 2018). Many factors may 
be involved in why organizations fail to learn (Argyris, 1976; Stern, 
1997; Smith and Elliott, 2007). One striking feature of the learning 
processes following the Svalbard avalanches in 2015 and 2017 is the 
extent to which the lessons identified have been acted upon, and mea-
sures implemented to address them. The mobilization of public aware-
ness, political will and funding have been critical factors in ensuring the 
implementation of measures identified by the two evaluation reports. As 
shown above, all 42 lessons identified by the two reports have triggered 
some form of action in terms of implementation, with the exception of 
L20 from 2015, which does not lie within the mandate of the Svalbard 
local authorities (INF 4). We can also note great variety in measures 
taken for implementing the lessons identified, ranging from no action 
(identification of established practices), to informal implementation like 
establishing ‘rules of thumb’ among forecasters – and to comprehensive 
changes, like implementing a local avalanche warning system for 
Longyearbyen, and following up on risk and vulnerability analysis. 
Although it is not within the scope of this study, it also noteworthy 
how the evaluation processes and the implementation of avalanche 
warning and preparedness systems have snowballed. The new under-
standing of avalanche danger and preparedness has led to a series of 
organizational changes, rules and regulations, prevention and pre-
paredness measures, plans and policy documents beyond what was 
identified by the evaluation reports (DSB, 2016; NVE, 2017). This in-
cludes temporary measures like evacuation and road-closures, as well as 
permanent measures like physical barriers and resettlement plans (LLG, 
2017). This is partly based on L23 from 2015, on the need to follow up 
on risk and vulnerability analyses (DSB, 2016). However, it is also an 
outcome of the new perceptions of risks related to avalanches and the 
new knowledge generated by the avalanche warning system (INF 1–5). 
Indeed, the learning process and consequent changes have taken on a 
dynamic of their own. 
5.5. Lessons for post-crisis learning 
The literature is divided on the effects of post-crisis learning. Some 
studies have highlighted that post-crisis learning is difficult (Stern, 
1997; Smith and Elliott, 2007; Broekema, et al., 2017), often result in 
‘fantasy documents’ (Clarke. 1999), findings are not acted upon 
(Deverell, 2009; Pursiainen, 2018), or are without practical value for 
solving the problem at hand (Birkland 2009). This can be further 
aggravated by uncertainties and external pressures on decision-makers 
that often follow in the aftermath of a crisis (Dekker and Hansén, 
2004). Others assume that crises will lead to rational evaluations, les-
sons and improvements that enhance future crisis management 
(Drennan et al., 2015). Birkland argues that sound instrumental policy 
learning can be achieved by ‘careful investigation, assessment, and 
policy design’ (2009, p. 150). It is therefore important to identify factors 
that promote or inhibit processes of post-crisis-learning (Elliott, 2009). 
5.5.1. Factors facilitating and inhibiting learning 
Our findings from the 2015 and 2017 post-crisis learning processes 
are generally positive: the lessons identified (with one exception) have 
been followed up by some form of action, resulting in extensive pro-
cesses of change. Three factors were central in facilitating the relatively 
expedient actions taken in establishing a preparedness system following 
the 2015 avalanche. First, all the relevant actors – the public and 
volunteer organizations responsible for emergency response – were to 
some extent involved in the evaluation process in 2015/2016. This 
ensured that the learning process did not result in mere ‘fantasy 
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documents’ (Clarke, 1999) without instrumental effect (Birkland, 2009). 
Such participation was also crucial during the implementation stage. 
This was also the case in 2017, where the evaluation was conducted by 
those directly involved in the avalanche warning system. Second, the 
existing model for avalanche monitoring and preparedness established 
regionally on mainland Norway could be adopted and at least partly 
adapted to Longyearbyen. Consequently here were no means–ends 
conflicts, and authorities could take swift action, thereby reducing the 
political pressure (Dekker and Hansén, 2004). The local avalanche 
warning system followed a similar model, but to a larger extent adapted 
to local conditions. Third, the level of public awareness ensured that the 
issue remained high on the agenda. Previous research has found that 
political involvement may both facilitate (Dekker and Hansén, 2004) 
and inhibit (Argyris, 1976; Elliott, 2009; Senge, 1990) post-crisis 
learning. Our study provides evidence of positive synergies between 
politics and practice, where the avalanche events led to mobilization of 
public awareness, political will and resources. 
However, we also find cases of lessons not learnt. Achieving a level of 
learning which addresses the root causes of disasters is important, as 
failure to do so may lead to further disasters (Miner and Mezias, 1996, p. 
89). The avalanche in 2017 necessarily prompts the question: what 
lessons were not learnt after the 2015 avalanche? The local and regional 
avalanche preparedness systems adopted were based on an established 
model from mainland Norway, and drew on the best available meteo-
rological and historical avalanche data from Longyearbyen. However, 
this proved to be flawed: the inputs of climate change had changed the 
natural conditions far more severely on Svalbard than on the mainland. 
Thus, an important lesson not identified concerned climate change and 
the consequences for uncertainties regarding natural conditions, 
avalanche paths and increased vulnerabilities. That was a root cause to 
the events in 2017 and became a main focus during the ensuing evalu-
ation. What today is common knowledge about climate change on 
Svalbard was not so in 2015. 
Another case-specific factor relevant to emergency response in 
Svalbard is the high turnover in the resident population. This was one 
reason why historical knowledge of the avalanche danger in Lia had 
been ‘lost’ by response authorities prior to 2015. And yet, when the NVE 
evaluated the avalanche in 2017, most lessons identified were followed 
up by informal implementation measures, ‘rules of thumb’, rather than 
formal rules and procedures (NVE, 2017). This clearly makes the 
avalanche preparedness system vulnerable to changes in personnel and 
loss of institutional memory, not least as the Svalbard avalanche system 
has now been out-sourced to private consultants. The need to formalize 
rules and procedures seems to be a lesson not learnt after the 2017 
avalanche. 
5.5.2. Mechanisms of learning 
The findings of our study underline how organizational learning 
processes are not a question of either-or in terms of single- and double- 
loop learning. We have seen how double-loop learning (the need for 
avalanche warning and preparedness in 2015; or uncertainty, rather 
than cumulative knowledge, as a basis for assessments in 2017) has been 
followed up by a range of single-loop lessons: the effectiveness of the 
learning process relies on both forms of learning. This is in line with the 
findings of Deverell (2009), and makes clear the need to balance be-
tween ‘doing things right’ and ‘doing the right things’ (Bakacsi, 2010, p. 
5). 
The emergency management system in Svalbard can be seen as a 
network of public and private actors (Moynihan, 2008a). This provided 
the context for both the identification and implementation phases of 
post-crisis learning following the 2015 avalanche. The identification of 
lessons was structured by the DSB-led evaluation process, where all 
relevant actors provided inputs (DSB, 2016). In addition, actors in the 
network conducted processes of intra-organizational learning (INF 1–5). 
Further, during the implementation stage, actors met in diverse arenas 
to discuss solutions and experiences in implementing measures. 
Learning here was inter-organizational. The arenas were not specifically 
dedicated to the purpose, and not all relevant actors participated. One 
informant noted that this lack of a joint, agreed process inhibited 
network learning (INF 3). Although the network (the preparedness 
system) provided the context and focal point for post-crisis learning, the 
learning processes themselves were organizational and inter- 
organizational. However, the learning outcomes were largely the 
same, as they did lead to fundamental changes in system attributes such 
as interactions, processes and structures, institutionalization of coordi-
nated practices, implementation of shared views and interpretations 
(Dunford and Jones, 2000). 
Following the avalanche in 2017, the focus was more on (intra) 
organizational learning by the NVE, with the identification and imple-
mentation phases largely organized as intra-organizational learning 
processes. However, the results had system-wide implications, as the 
organization in question was the NVE, the dominant actor in avalanche 
preparedness throughout Norway. What both cases highlight is how 
learning continues during the implementation stage, and through 
diverse arenas within a network. This in turn indicates that effective 
learning relies on the long-term participation and efforts of relevant 
actors using multiple channels – also after media, political and (to some 
extent) public attention has lessened. 
6. Conclusions 
Learning from crisis in order to avoid future unwanted events is a 
central purpose of crisis management. Among the main research chal-
lenges here is lack of empirical studies or examination of the factors that 
promote or inhibit learning in often complex and turbulent post-crisis 
contexts. We have analysed a double case-study of avalanches on Sval-
bard that occurred in the same location within little more than one year 
– a highly relevant case for analysis of post-crisis learning. 
We find a mixed picture as to the effectiveness of learning. On the 
one hand, the learning processes can be said to have been successful. In 
only a few years after the 2015 avalanche, an avalanche warning and 
preparedness system (local and regional) had been established, setting 
the standard for many regions of mainland Norway (INF 1–5). On the 
other hand, the avalanche in 2017 indicates that this system failed: it 
had not taken into full account the consequences of climate change on 
local avalanche danger in Longyearbyen, as became clear from the 
learning process after that second avalanche (NVE, 2017). On the other 
hand, it should be noted that what is now common knowledge about 
climate change on Svalbard was not so in 2015. 
The nature of the dramatic avalanche events brought willingness to 
evaluate fundamental aspects of existing approaches through double- 
loop learning. Here the effectiveness of double-loop learning relied, 
among other factors, on the implementation of multiple single-loop 
lessons; through defining roles, rules and procedures. However, as this 
double-case also demonstrates, learning once is not enough: it must be a 
continuous process. 
‘Learning’, in the sense applied here, includes both the identification 
and implementation of lessons (Deverell 2009). We find that learning 
within and among organizations continues on multiple arenas 
throughout the implementation stage, with discussion of solutions and 
experiences. This highlights the importance of long-term involvement 
by all relevant actors in the learning processes, not something that ends 
with the written evaluation report. In cases of a larger scale and 
complexity than the two avalanches on Svalbard, the consequences of 
not establishing a joint network or inter-organizational learning arena 
could be more severe, not least as interactions in other formal and 
informal arenas may not be as frequent. 
A main uncertainty for post-crisis learning is the effect of contextual 
factors like political turbulence and public pressure. In the Svalbard 
case, there were synergies between political involvement and public 
awareness and the ability to act on the lessons that were identified. The 
two avalanches served as focusing events (Kingdon, 1995) that provided 
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opportunities for change (Birkland, 2009). The availability and experi-
ence with avalanche monitoring and preparedness models meant that 
the authorities could act relatively swiftly and reduce pressure. And 
finally, there were also synergies between political will, public aware-
ness and the ability of the involved actors to keep the issue high on the 
agenda and mobilize the necessary resources to get changes 
implemented. 
This study has illuminated some of the central challenges in post- 
crisis learning. However, there is a need for further in-depth studies 
on under what conditions post-crisis learning takes place. 
One strategy is to analyse how actors within crisis management 
systems handle challenges posed by climate change. The uncertainties 
stemming from climate change often pose fundamental challenges to 
authorities and managers responsible for dealing with them, as also 
demonstrated in this study. There is the need to find the right balance 
between continuity and change; under what conditions should learning 
be focused on single-loop learning improving the performance of exist-
ing crisis management systems (‘doing things right’), and when does it 
require that these systems undergo more fundamental changes (‘doing 
the right things’) through double-loop learning (Bakacsi, 2010, p.5). 
Moreover there is a need to investigate how single- and double-loop 
learning relate to, in terms of facilitating or impeding, each other. As 
such, in-depth studies provide opportunities for analysing critical issues 
in post-crisis learning. In particular how to handle increased un-
certainties and achieving at times high-cost lessons through double-loop 
learning. By gathering more knowledge one may also achieve increased 
cross-sectoral learning, i.e. between different issue-areas or crisis man-
agement systems. Such knowledge is important to avoid future crisis 
that could have been avoided if the ‘right lessons’ had been learnt at an 
earlier stage. Further it may teach us much about the resilience of crisis 
management systems and their ability to learn and implement changes 
under dynamic conditions. 
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